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COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
THIRD CIRCUIT
United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174 (3rd Cir. 2011) (holding the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had jurisdiction to compel Donovan to
remove material used to fill wetlands on his property based on two jurisdictional tests developed in federal case law interpreting the Clean Water
Act).
In 1987, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") inspected land
belonging to David H. Donovan and determined that Donovan had filled
three-quarters of an acre of wetlands on his four-acre parcel of land in
New Castle County, Delaware. The wetlands were connected by rainwater channels to the Sawmill Branch of the Smyrna River, which flows
into the Delaware Estuary on the Delaware Bay.
After Donovan refused to remove the fill material from his land, the
Corps issued a cease-and-desist letter to Donovan, ordering him to remove the fill material or submit a pre-discharge notification. After
Donovan ignored this and subsequent similar notices, the U.S. sued
Donovan, alleging he violated the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), which requires a landowner to obtain a permit from the Corps prior to filling any
wetlands.
In March 2002, the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware ("district court") held that Donovan violated the CWA, and
Donovan appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Third Circuit
("court"). The court dismissed Donovan's appeal because the district
court's judgment had not yet been finalized. In December 2006, the district court entered its final judgment, fining Donovan $250,000 and requiring him to remove the fill material from his wetlands. Donovan again
appealed the district court's judgment to the court. On his second appeal, Donovan argued the Corps did not have jurisdiction over his land
under the CWA. The court remanded the case in order to develop the
record on the issue of the Corps' jurisdiction over Donovan's land.
On remand, the district court appointed a Magistrate Judge for all
pretrial matters. Donovan moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the
U.S. moved for summary judgment. The U.S. presented testimony and
reports from two expert witnesses to show it did have jurisdiction over
Donovan's land based on federal case law interpreting the CWA. Donovan did not present any expert testimony and instead relied on his own
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affidavit that expressed familiarity with his property, concluding it was not
subject to the CWA. He argued that during periods of no rain, the channels on his property were completely dry, and that during rainy periods,
the rain channels were easy to differentiate from neighboring land, which
was subject to the CWA. The Magistrate Judge concluded Donovan's
land would be subject to CWA jurisdiction if it met either test articulated
in Rapanos v. United States.
Rapanos, a United States Supreme Court case decided in 2006, resulted in a plurality decision in which the Justices voted 4-1-4 on which
test to apply to determine whether certain waters are subject to the CWA.
The plurality held that wetlands fall under CWA jurisdiction if they have
"a continuous surface connection to bodies that are 'waters of the United
States' in their own right, so that there is no clear demarcation between
'waters' and wetlands." The concurring Justice argued CWA jurisdiction
extended to wetlands with a "significant nexus" with "waters of the United
States." This test would consider the "chemical, physical, and biological"
relationship between navigable waters and similarly situated wetlands.
The dissenting Justices took the broadest stance and argued that if wetlands met either the plurality or concurrence's test, they would be subject
to the CWA.
The district court concluded, based on the United States' expert testimony and reports, that Donovan's land was subject to federal jurisdiction under both tests articulated in Rapanos the "continuous surface
connection test" and the "significant nexus test." Donovan again appealed to the 3"' Circuit, arguing Rapanos does not provide a clear legal
standard to determine whether the Corps had jurisdiction over Donovan's wetlands.
Along with the First and Eighth circuits, the court held that if a wetland meets either test articulated in Rapanos it is subject to the CWA.
The court reasoned applying either test was proper because the dissent in
Rapanos would have found federal jurisdiction under both tests. Furthermore, the dissent stated in future cases, the U.S. may prove jurisdiction under either test.
Donovan made two factual arguments on appeal, again supported by
his own affidavit. Donovan first stated that the amount of water flowing
through his property is dependant on the amount of rainfall and can be
completely dry at times. He also claimed that when water is flowing
through his property the rainwater channels are easy to distinguish from
the wetlands.
However, the court found that the expert reports established Donovan's wetlands had a "relatively permanent" connection to waters that
were navigable-in-fact starting with the rain channels on Donovan's land,
meeting the criteria for a "continuous surface connection." The court
further held the expert reports established the government's burden of
proof to meet the "significant nexus test." This holding was based on an
extensive analysis of the area's ecosystem, as well as chemical testing
conducted by the experts.
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Because Donovan did not present any evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Government and denied Donovan's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
John Lahner

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Keating v. Neb. Pub. Power DisL, 660 F.3d 1014 (8' Cir. 2011)
(holding that junior permit holders did not have a property right in watershed entitling them to a predeprivation hearing where the officials authorized to administer water use determined that the supply was insufficient
and the use permits provided notice of discontinuation under such circumstances).
When water levels in the Niobrara River fell in 2006, the Nebraska
Department of Natural Resources ("officials") issued Closing Notices to
hundreds of holders of junior surface water appropriation permits, ordering them to discontinue the drawing of water from the Watershed. However, the officials did not first grant the permit holders a hearing on the
matter. A group of farmers who had received the Notices ("farmers")
filed a § 1983 suit against the state officials, claiming that the order deprived them of their property without procedural due process. The
United States District Court for the District of Nebraska ("district court")
held that, while the farmers possessed a property right that entitled them
to use of the water, it was subject to administration by the officials. Furthermore, the district court concluded that the issuance of the Closing
Notices was an administrative act that did not constitute a property deprivation. Accordingly, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the officials.
Applying a de novo standard of review, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals ("court") first considered the existence of the farmers' property
rights. The parties agreed that the farmers had property rights to surface
water appropriation, which according to the court, allowed only for use of
the water subject to restrictions set forth by the permit. The permits belonging to the farmers provided that they could use specified amounts of
surface water where supply allowed.
The farmers argued that, when water levels were insufficient and required discontinuation of use, they were entitled to a predeprivation hearing during which they could challenge: (1) the validity of the Nebraska
Public Power District's senior appropriation permits that entitled it to
surface water rights before the farmers; and (2) the purported insufficiency of water levels in the Niobrara River.
The court rejected these arguments holding that, once the officials
identified a water shortage, the farmers and other junior permit holders

